Nearly two decades after Nepal’s civil war ended in 2006, victims and their families still await justice with candlelit vigils, worn-out court petitions, and tearful testimonies. Their grief has turned into quiet resilience. The decade-long Maoist insurgency (1996–2006) cost an estimated 17,000 lives and left approximately 3,000 missing. The war ended with a 2006 peace agreement that promised truth, accountability, and reconciliation for these atrocities. However, transitional justice, the mechanism meant to address past human rights violations, remains an unfinished project. The struggle for transitional justice continues to define Nepal’s post-conflict journey. The result is a pervasive “crisis of impunity” where perpetrators of conflict-era crimes have never been held to account. Why has justice been delayed, and is it effectively denied? The goal is to determine whether ICC ratification offers a credible path for Nepal to finally secure justice and lasting reconciliation. Alternatively, it questions if delaying justice has effectively denied it. 

After the civil war, the Government of Nepal established two bodies in 2015 under the Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 2014: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP). These commissions received over 63,000 complaints from victims, with over 60,000 alleging human rights violations to the TRC and around 3000 enforced disappearance cases to the CIEPD. As of 2024, TRC has completed preliminary investigations for only about 3,700 cases. The CIEPD decided on comprehensive investigations for 2,490 cases. However, reports indicate that neither commission has successfully resolved a single case to date. Many cases remain unresolved because, even after the act was enacted, commissioner posts in both the commissions have remained vacant.  By 2023–24, with commissions dormant, conflict victims and civil society intensified their push for a credible process. In response, Nepal’s parliament finally passed a new transitional justice bill in August 2024.

At a National Conference on Transitional Justice on March 27, 2025, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, along with other political leaders and civil society groups, reaffirmed their commitment to implementing effective transitional justice mechanisms. Observers describe this stagnation as a “judicial merry-go-round” or even “transitional injustice”. A conflict victim who filed a case 7 years prior lamented that her complaint was “in adjournment... not ended, yet not being forwarded either.”​ The lack of tangible progress has eroded public confidence; the commissions are seen as hollow and designed without the support to produce actual consequences. 

The failure of the TRC/CIEPD has real impacts on society. Victims feel abandoned by the justice system. Many have received only tokens of ‘interim relief’ payments but no acknowledgement or accountability for their suffering. Overall, Nepal’s transitional justice process to date can be summed up as “justice adjourned.” The challenge now is to restart it in a credible way, which leads to growing calls to look beyond Nepal’s borders to the International Criminal Court (ICC). 

The ICC, created by the Rome Statute, 1998, is the world’s first tribunal set up to prosecute individuals for the gravest crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and since 2018, even the crimes of aggression. The ICC has 125 member states as of today, though notably not Nepal and serves as an independent court of last resort intended to bring justice when countries are unwilling or unable to do so themselves. Among its few limitations, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed on or after 1 July 2002 and cannot prosecute earlier events. 

The ICC can exercise its jurisdiction mainly through three pathways. First, referral by or consent from state parties. For example, Uganda (an ICC member) referred its northern conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC in 2003 which led to the indictment of LRA leaders. Second, ad hoc consent by non-members under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. Third, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referral under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNSC referral is applied globally, including non-members as well. For example, in 2005, the UNSC referred the Darfur crisis (2005) in Sudan to the ICC despite Sudan not being an ICC member. The Security Council referral enabled the ICC to investigate. However, the ICC’s jurisdiction operates under the principle of complementarity. It intervenes only when national authorities are unwilling or unable to prosecute crimes and thus respect state sovereignty and ensure accountability. The ICC prosecutor can also initiate an investigation proprio motu (on their own initiative) (Art. 15 of the Rome Statute) in a state party’s territory (or involving its citizens) but must get approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber of ICC judges. For example, in March 2010, the ICC prosecutor initiated a proprio motu investigation into the 2007–2008 post-election violence in Kenya after obtaining the Pre-Trial Chamber’s approval.

Nepal is not a state party to the Rome Statute. Although it signed the treaty back in 2000, it never completed the ratification process. As a result, the International Criminal Court (ICC) lacks automatic jurisdiction over crimes committed within Nepal’s territory. This makes it challenging to prosecute its past conflict crimes through the Hague. However, it is not entirely impossible. For prosecution to proceed, jurisdiction must be overcome through specific pathways.

One such option is UN Security Council (UNSC) referral. The UNSC can grant jurisdiction to the ICC by referring to situations in non-member states. This happened previously with Sudan and Libya. However, such a referral for Nepal is improbable. Since the conflict ended nearly two decades ago, it diminished the urgency typically required for UNSC action. Additionally, China, a veto power member and Nepal’s neighbour, generally opposes ICC interventions in non-member states, which makes UNSC referral more politically unlikely. 

A more feasible direction for establishing ICC jurisdiction would be for Nepal to grant it voluntarily. That is, either by ratifying the Rome Statute with a retroactive application under Art. 11(2) or by submitting an ad hoc declaration as outlined in Art. 12(3). Putting these articles together, a state can essentially “backdate” or extend ICC jurisdiction to crimes committed before its ratification if it makes an Art. 12(3) declaration. While the statute generally does not operate retroactively, Art. 11(2) permits states to extend the Court’s jurisdiction back to July 1, 2002, the date the Rome Statute entered into force. This approach has precedent. Côte d’Ivoire utilised the same legal mechanism following the 2010 post-election crisis. It ultimately led to the prosecution of former president Laurent Gbagbo by the ICC. In a similar manner, Nepal could enable the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes committed between 2002 and 2006 during its civil conflict. 

For the ICC to prosecute crimes from Nepal’s civil conflict, the offences must be grave, national courts must be unwilling or unable to act, and state cooperation is essential. (Rome Statute, Art 17) Documented abuses, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and rape by both government forces and Maoist insurgents. Such crimes meet the threshold for war crimes or crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute, Art.7 & 8. As per the ICC principle of complementarity, it only intervenes if national authorities are “unwilling or unable” to prosecute genuinely. Given the long paralysis of domestic efforts, one could argue Nepal has been “unwilling or unable” to proceed—a point even Nepal’s Supreme Court in the case Suman Adhikari vs. Government of Nepal implicitly recognised when it noted that transitional bodies are no substitute for criminal trials​. Nepal’s failure to prosecute domestically could satisfy ICC admissibility, but political resistance from leaders poses a major obstacle. It’s worth noting that even if jurisdictional hurdles are cleared, ICC prosecutions are no simple fix. The ICC relies on state cooperation to arrest suspects and if the Nepali government (or its allies) refuses to surrender an indicted person, the case could stall. Years-long investigations would be needed to build solid cases, and witnesses would need protection. Nonetheless, the very prospect of ICC action can be a game-changer.

Any move to bring in the ICC must grapple with a fundamental question: would it promote Nepal’s peace or jeopardise it? ICC engagement could finally pierce the shield of impunity that Nepal’s perpetrators have enjoyed. Knowing that even high-ranking officials could face international prosecution would send a powerful message that no one is above the law. For thousands of victims, ICC involvement offers a real chance at justice after years of domestic failure. An ICC process may catalyse improvements in Nepal’s own judiciary and investigative bodies. Nepal has already ratified most core human rights treaties. Joining the ICC system is a logical extension of that commitment. This could have diplomatic and economic benefits.   

In Uganda, ICC involvement brought global attention to atrocities and led to the conviction of LRA commander Dominic Ongwen, though it complicated peace talks during active conflict. The Democratic Republic of Congo saw the ICC remove notorious warlords like Lubanga and Ntaganda, reinforcing justice but not ending violence. Côte d’Ivoire’s invitation to the ICC resulted in high-profile trials, such as of the former Ivorian President Gbagbo, showing that even leaders could face justice. In the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, UN tribunals prosecuted top officials, laid the foundation for reconciliation, and proved that international justice can support long-term healing. These tribunals showed the benefit of combining global mechanisms with local efforts. Sri Lanka’s refusal to engage with international mechanisms has left it facing criticism and unresolved tensions. Across all these cases, state cooperation was crucial. Where governments collaborated, justice progressed; where they resisted, accountability stalled.  

For Nepal, the takeaway is clear: international justice does not have to threaten peace, especially when the conflict is long over. If backed by credible domestic efforts, ICC involvement could still serve a purpose. It may be the key to finally delivering accountability. 

Moving forward, Nepal has a spectrum of policy options which can range from immediate fixes in domestic mechanisms to more transformative steps of engaging ICC. The approaches should complement each other.  

Nepal should amend the 2024 transitional justice law to explicitly ban amnesties for all serious international crimes, including torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The definition of “serious violations” should be broadened so that no grave offence is left out. It must also enforce the law by establishing and resourcing the Special Court. Appointments to the TRC and CIEDP should be transparent and include victim input. Police and prosecutors need authority and training to investigate wartime crimes. Victim reparations, including healthcare, education, and memorials, should begin immediately. Nepal must criminalise torture and enforced disappearance and act on National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) recommendations. 

In the long run, Nepal should accede to the ICC’s Rome Statute, becoming a full-state party. As put by Christopher Keith Hall, senior legal advisor of International Justice Project Amnesty International, “By joining over 100 other countries in all regions of the world that have ratified the Rome Statute, Nepal would signal that it believes justice and accountability for the worst human rights violations are central to the rule of law and a stable, just system of governance”. On 25 July 2006, the newly reformed House of Representatives unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon the government to accede to the Rome Statute. Joining the ICC would show commitment to global justice and enable prosecution of past crimes. A hybrid court with international judges could be a practical alternative. Public education and engagement with global partners will help embed justice and prevent relapse.

Nepal’s ICC dilemma boils down to a choice: continue with the status quo of impunity or take a leap toward accountability with international support. Justice delayed has been the status quo, but justice denied is not the inevitable conclusion. With political courage, Nepal can choose justice delivered. The ICC is one important means to that end. By integrating into the ICC system, Nepal would fulfil both a domestic duty and an international commitment. Justice was part of the peace dividend that Nepalese were promised. Fulfilling the promise is essential for the peace to be sustainable. Accountability is a prerequisite for a truly peaceful and inclusive Nepal so that the country can move forward with confidence that justice, however delayed, was not ultimately denied. 

Transitional justice is inherently political in nature, but it cannot come at the expense of international legal obligations. The framework must adhere to international human rights law, humanitarian law, and international criminal law. Upholding these standards is crucial not only to safeguard the rights of victims but also to ensure the broader credibility and effectiveness of the entire process.

- ICJ Secretary General Santiago Canton, Remarks at the National Conference on Transitional Justice, 2025